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Eliminating the Domestic Terrorist Threat in
the United States: A Case Study on the
Eradication of the Red Brigades
Matthew E. Dunham*
I.

Introduction

Since September 11, 2001, every American has probably experienced
some level of fear, hopelessness, or vulnerability connected to the
seeming randomness of terrorist acts. Americans may even wonder if
terrorism can ever be eradicated. On the question of eradication, former
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is positive that terrorism can
be stopped. He argues that Western nations can put an end to terrorism
by breaking the backs of terrorist organizations, thereby eliminating their
ability to strike.1
This comment focuses on the domestic terrorist threat to the United
States by groups originating from the United States and operating within
its borders. Specifically, a comparison will be drawn between the
challenges facing the United States today and those faced by the Italian
government in the 1970s and 1980s, during which it "broke the back" of
the Brigate Rosse ("Red Brigades"), the most active domestic terrorist
2
groups in Italy at the time.
* J.D. Candidate, Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,
2003.
1. Benjamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the West Can Win, in TERRORISM: How
CAN WIN 199, 202 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986).
2. Walter Lacquer, Reflections on the Eradicationof Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES, CONTROLS 207, 210 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed.,
THE WEST

1990); see also RICHARD CLUTrERBUCK, TERRORISM, DRUGS AND CRIME IN EUROPE

AFTER 1992, at 26 (1990) ("Of all [European democratic countries], Italy probably offers
the most valuable lessons in the fields of terrorism."). Between 1969 and 1987, there
were 14,599 acts of terrorism reported in Italy that resulted in 419 deaths and 1182
injuries. Id. Both left-wing terrorist groups and right-wing terrorist groups carried out
these terrorist acts. Id. at 28. (It is important to note that researches do not agree on the
number of injuries and casualties attributable to each terrorist attack in Italy during this
period. The figures stated in this comment reflect the opinion and research of the author
cited.) Because the Red Brigades, which were left-wing terrorist groups, were the most
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The United States and Italy are similar in three important aspects
relating to domestic terrorism. First, the governments of both nations are
democracies that have been threatened by domestic terrorist groups.3
Second, each nation's legislature has adopted emergency legislation to
combat terrorism. 4 Finally, like Italy in the 1970s and 1980s, the United
States seeks to eradicate domestic terrorism from its borders. These
strong similarities suggest that American policymakers can successfully
import Italian
counter-terror measures to combat United States domestic
5
terrorism.
Part II of this comment will provide an overview of the history of
the Red Brigades and their terrorist activity in Italy and will explore
legislation passed by the Italian Parliament designed to counter the
domestic terrorist threat. Part III will survey recent domestic terrorist
activity on United States soil, evidencing the possibility of a domestic
terrorist campaign similar to the terrorist activity of the Red Brigades.
Part IV will explore the provisions in the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001,6 better known as the USA Patriot Act of
2001, that apply to countering the domestic terrorism threat, and will
suggest additional measures that the United States should take to fight
domestic terrorism based on the Italian model.
Specifically, this
comment suggests that United States legislators should consider

significant domestic terrorist threat in Italy during this period, id., it will be the primary
focus of this comment.
3. The primary goal of terrorists operating in a democracy is the same: that is,
terrorists attempt to destroy democracies by creating an atmosphere of fear in the
citizenry and by targeting the foundations of democracy. George P. Shultz, The
Challenge to Democracies, in TERRORISM: How THE WEST CAN WIN, supra note 1, at 17.
The author of this comment opines that domestic nations can learn from other democratic
nations' experiences with terrorism despite any logistical differences that may exist
between the two nations.
4. See generally CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 37-45 (giving a general discussion
of the legislation passed by the Italian Parliament in reaction to escalating terrorist
violence); see also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of
U.S.C.) (illustrating the reaction of the United States Congress to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001).
5. The transposition of foreign law is a beneficial and useful tool of comparative
law. See infra text accompanying notes 201-06. See generally PETER DE CRUZ,
COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD, at 20 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that the ancient
Greeks and Romans were the first to transpose laws of foreign cities into their own
legislative framework for the benefit of their own cultures and generally discussing the
value comparative law).
6. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001 (codified as amended in
scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.).
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formalizing a penitence system that would give grace in sentencing to
terrorist members who surrender to authorities and provide law
enforcement with useful information about their respective terrorist
organizations. 7 In addition, policymakers should contemplate legislation
that would enable law enforcement to reach terrorist members who act
on the periphery, perhaps by criminalizing membership in known
terrorist organizations, 8 and legislation that would broaden the search and
seizure powers of law enforcement personnel. 9 Finally, Part V will
conclude this comment.
The Red Brigades and Italian Counter-Terrorism Legislation

II.

In the mid-1960s, Italy began to feel the effects of the industrial
movement that was concentrated in the northern part of the country.' 0
Many southerners had flocked north during this period with the hopes of
finding better work, and the sudden migration resulted in a clash of
cultures between northerners and southerners that deeply affected the
social and cultural norms of Italian life.11 By the end of the decade, the
culture clash and industrialization had caused the cost of living to rise
along with unemployment and inflation. 2
Workers and students protested, often violently, over the decline in
13
wages and the quality of working conditions and educational facilities.
The Italian government, paralyzed by inter-party squabbles, could not
intervene because it was unable to agree on a solution. 14 The violence
generated by disgruntled factory workers and students continued to
escalate, and, in 1969, the violence culminated in the Piazza Fontana
bombing at the Banca Nazionale dell' Agricoltura in Milan. 5 The
right-wing extremists, killed
bombing, thought to be the work 1 of
6
seventeen people and wounded ninety.
Led by a group of students from the north of Italy, mostly with
working-class backgrounds and Marxist-Leninist ideologies, 17 the Red
7.
8.
9.

See infra text accompanying 85-91, 109-30, 222-26.
See infra text accompanying notes 97-101, 227-33.
See infra text accompanying notes 87-89, 102-06, 234-41.

IN
AND
TERRORISM
MYSTIQUE
REVOLUTIONARY
DRAKE,
10. RICHARD
CONTEMPORARY ITALY 1 (1989).
11. Id.; ROBERT C. MEADE, JR., THE RED BRIGADES: THE STORY OF ITALIAN
TERRORISM 18 (1989).
12. DRAKE, supra note 10, at 1-2; MEADE, supra note 11, at 17.
13. DRAKE, supra note 10, at 2.
14. Id.; MEADE, supranote 11, at 18-33.
15. DRAKE, supra note 10, at 2; LEONARD WEINBERG & WILLIAM LEE EUBANK, THE
RISE AND FALL OF ITALIAN TERRORISM 32 (1987).
16. DRAKE, supra note 10, at 2; CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 27; WEINBERG &
EUBANK, supra note 15.
17. MEADE, supra note 11, at 17; Danila Salvioni and Anders Stephanson,
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Brigades organized after the Piazza Fontana bombing. Renato Curcio,
his wife, Mara Cagol, Alberto Franceschini, and Mario Moretti founded
the group in Milan in 1970.18 The Brigatisti, as they were known,9
"pictured the world as a victim of American and Soviet imperialism."'
They sought to impose on Italy "the lovely perfections of the theoretical
socialist state.,, 20 The Red Brigades staged non-violent protests and
demonstrations against the Italian democratic state, but the group never
gained the support of the Italian Communist Party ("PCI") in the political
arena of Parliament. 21 As a result, the Red Brigades resorted to terrorist
violence as a means of establishing a socialist society.
The structure of the Red Brigades consisted of a Strategic
Directorate and several "columns" of about 1500 members each.22 While
linked to the Strategic Directorate, these columns were independent and
mobile, and every column had its own "cells" (or "brigades") of three to
five members each.23 Within these cells, members operated in a
clandestine
fashion, making it difficult for law enforcement to track
24
them.

In the early 1970s, the Red Brigades' primary terrorist actions
consisted of fire-bombings, bank robberies, 25 and short-term kidnappings
of personnel managers and others, who, in their opinion, exploited
factory workers.2 6 Despite the Red Brigades' increased activity, the
Italian government failed to take the group seriously. 27 As a result, Italy
was unprepared for the escalation of terrorist violence to come. 28 In the
years 1969-74, 2300 acts of terrorism left ninety-two persons dead and
2792 wounded.2 9
The Red Brigades received major publicity on April 18, 1974, when
they kidnapped Mario Sossi, a right-wing judge, in Genoa. 30 This was
the Red Brigades' first direct attack on the state. 31 They subjected Sossi
Reflections on the Red Brigades, 29 ORBIS 489, 491 (1985).
18.

CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 30.

19. DRAKE, supra note 10, at 136.
20. MEADE, supra note 11, at 17.
21. Id. at 28.
22. Kimber M. Schraub, The Rise and Fall of the Red Brigades, in THE POLITICS OF
COUNTERTERRORISM: THE ORDEAL OF DEMOCRATIC STATES 137, 154 (Barry Rubin ed.,
1990).
23. Id.
24. MEADE, supra note 11, at 51; Schraub, supra note 22, at 154.
25. See generally MEADE, supra note 11, at 41-54 (giving a detailed overview of the
early activities of the Red Brigades).
26. CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 30.
27. MEADE, supra note 11, at 47; WEINBERG & EUBANK, supra note 15, at 122.
28. MEADE, supra note 11, at 47-48.
29. Id. at 54.
30. DRAKE, supra note 10, at 12.
31. Id. at 13.
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to a proletarian "trial" and demanded that eight members from the
terrorist group XXI Ottobre ("October
22"), a precursor of the Red
32
Brigades, be released from prison.
The Italian government negotiated with the Red Brigades for thirtyfive days while searching for Sossi with 4000 armed men. 33 The search
proved futile, 34 but eventually Prosecutor General Francesco Coco
persuaded a court to agree to the release of the eight members of XXII
Ottobre on the condition that the Red Brigades first release Sossi
unharmed. 35 After the Red Brigades released Sossi, Coco convinced the
government to renege on the agreement, a decision that would later cost
Coco his life.36
The Sossi kidnapping prompted the government to take some
measures to end the terrorist activity, and General Carlo Alberto Dalla
Chiesa of the Carabinieri 37 was appointed to direct the counter-terrorist
effort against the Red Brigades.38 The government gave Dalla Chiesa
broad powers: accountable only to the Minister of the Interior, he did not
have to seek judicial approval for any of his actions. 39 Dalla Chiesa
handpicked two hundred men highly trained in surveillance as a part of
his anti-terrorism unit, and he strategically placed informants in prisons
and on the street to gather intelligence on the movements of the Red
Brigades.40
Good intelligence gathering and group infiltration allowed Dalla
Chiesa to arrest Curcio, Franceschini, and nine other founding members
of the Red Brigades. 4 1 A government infiltrator had advised Dalla
Chiesa of a planned meeting between Curcio and Franceschini,4 2 and
Dalla Chiesa set up a sting operation. In a bloodless confrontation,
Carabinieri officers captured these two founding leaders of the Red
Brigades.4 3
32. Christopher Seton-Watson, Terrorism in Italy, in THE THREAT OF TERRORISM 89,
96 (Juliet Lodge ed., 1988).
33. DRAKE, supra note 10, at 13.
34. Id.
35. WEINBERG & EUBANK, supra note 15, at 63.

36. Id. Weinberg and Eubank's opinion that Coco lost his life as a result of his
slippery dealings with the Red Brigades does not necessarily reflect the views of other
Red Brigades historians.
37. The Carabinieri are a militarized national police force. The Black Cross, S.F.
BAY GUARDIAN, Feb. 8, 2001, at http://www.sfbg.com/nessie/35.html.
38. CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 31.

39.
40.
41.

Id.
CLUT7ERBUCK,

supra note 2, at 31.

Id.

MEADE, supra note 11, at 60.
43. Id. Dalla Chiesa also managed to access records and documents of the Red
Brigades, facilitating the arrest of other members of the Red Brigades and the discovery
of hideouts. Id.

42.
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The arrest of Curcio and Franceschini appeared to cripple the Red
Brigades, but only for a short time. 44 In prison, Curcio walked about
freely, made unlimited telephone calls, and had unregulated visitation
rights.45 Due to the poor security of the prison system, on February 18,
1975, Mara Cagol, with three other Brigatisti brandishing machine guns,
walked into the prison, forced the guards into submission, and liberated
Curcio.4 6

After the breakout, the Red Brigades remained quiet until May
1975, when members wounded a politician from the Christian Democrat
party by shooting him in the knees.4 7 The deliberate shooting in the
knees was the preferred terrorist tactic of the Red Brigades and was to be
repeated so often that it gave rise to a new verb, gambizzare-to
kneecap.48
The resurgence of violence sparked by the attack prompted
Parliament to adopt legislation designed to fight political violence.49 On
May 22, 1975, Italy adopted the Legge Reale ("Reale Law") 50 in
response to two bombings in Bologna that killed sixteen people and
wounded over two hundred.5' Under the law, a police officer could stop
a person if he had sufficient proof that the person had violated a crime,
such as possession of illegal arms, ammunition, or explosives, and there
was a chance of escape.52 The law specifically stated that the officer did
not have to catch the suspect in the act in order for him to make an
arrest. 53 Once the officer apprehended the suspect, he could interrogate
the suspect immediately in order to gain sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause and charge him with a crime. 54 The officer had fortyeight hours to charge the suspect. 55 The law also allowed the police to
search persons and vehicles for arms, ammunition, or explosives if there
was sufficient reason to believe that the situation was urgent and
necessary and there was no time to obtain a warrant. 56 Such searches and
44. DRAKE, supra note 10, at 17.
45. Id.
46. MEADE, supra note 11, at 66.
47. Id.at 64.
48. Id.
49. CLUTrERBUCK, supra note 2, at 31 (discussing legislation adopted in response to
the growing terrorist threat); see also WEINBERG & EUBANK, supra note 15, at 123-24.
50. Law No. 152 of May 22, 1975, Gazz. Uff. No. 136, May 24, 1975; see also
CLUTrERBUCK, supra note 2, at 31.
51.

MEADE, supra note 11, at 57.

52. Gazz. Uff. No. 136; see also CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 31 (discussing the
provisions of this law).
53. Gazz. Uff. No. 136.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.

56.

Id.
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seizures were to be validated or verified by the public prosecutor within
forty-eight hours after he completed his own independent investigation.57
The establishment of the Reale Law, which gave law enforcement
additional tools to apprehend terrorists and suspected terrorists, aided in
the capture of more members of the Red Brigades. In June 1975, a group
of Brigatisti led by Mara Cagol kidnapped a wealthy vintner and held
him for ransom. 58 However, Dalla Chiesa managed to discover the
location at which the hostage was being held, and, in a shoot-out,
Carabinieri officers shot and killed Cagol.59 Soon after Cagol's death,
the momentum of the activity of the Red Brigades slowed and authorities
discovered more hideouts, and in
made a series of important arrests, 60
Curcio.
Renato
recaptured
1976,
early
With the recapture of Renato Curcio, the government believed that
it had eradicated the Red Brigades, as only fifteen regular members were
thought to be operating. 61 Even the press declared that the Red Brigades
were finished.62 Based on this belief, the Italian Parliament relaxed its
counter-terrorism efforts and disbanded General Dalla Chiesa's antiterror group.63 However, what seemed to be the subsiding of terrorist
activity was only a brief lull in a furious storm.
The storm surged in June 1976, when the Red Brigades assassinated
Prosecutor General Francesco Coco, who had double-crossed the Red
Brigades after the release of Mario Sossi in 1974. 64 The Red Brigades
also killed two of Coco's bodyguards in the attack.65 This was the Red
Brigades' first assassination of a selected target.66 At the time of Coco's
assassination, the Red Brigades were under the leadership of Mario
Moretti, "a highly professional terrorist who prepared and planned his
operations meticulously." 67 Under his leadership, terrorist violence
57.

Id.

58.

MEADE, supra note 11, at 66.

59.

Id.

60. Id. at 68. Curcio continued to play a role in the Red Brigades as a figure of
inspiration as a founder, but only from the inside of his prison cell. Id.

61.

CLUTTERBUCK,

supra note 2, at 32.

62. MEADE, supra note 11, at 74.
63. Id. at 76.
64. Id. at 73-74; see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
65. MEADE, supra note 11, at 73-74.
66. Id. at 75.
67. CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 32. The violence perpetrated by the Red
Brigades in 1977 included attacks on the director of the Ministry of Justice, nine
corporate officials of Fiat and other companies, three nationally known journalists, a
university professor, an officer of a religious group, and five Christian Democrat
politicians. MEADE, supra note 14, at 96. The Red Brigades assassinated a journalist
because of his conservatism and critical attitude towards the Red Brigades, and they
assassinated the head of the Order of Attorneys in Turin in an effort to further disrupt the
democratic process. Id. The attorney was responsible for defending Renato Curcio and
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escalated as the number of incidents increased in 1977 to 1806, including
twenty-three deaths and thirty-eight woundings.68 As the storm surged
through 1977, it gained momentum and was about to reach its highest
intensity, for Moretti and a new generation of Brigatisti "were secretly
preparing
an operation that would catch the attention of the whole
, 69
world.

That event was the kidnapping and eventual murder of Aldo Moro,
president of the Christian Democrat party and thought by the Red
Brigades to be the most influential politician in Italy at that time.7 ' To
the Red Brigades, Moro was
the "shrewd and skillful agent of the
71
oppressive capitalist system.,
On March 16, 1978, in a street ambush that lasted only fifteen
seconds, several Brigatisti seized Moro from his car and gunned down
five Carabinieri officers who were protecting him. 72 The Red Brigades
demanded the release of fifteen imprisoned Brigatistiand issued a series
of letters and press releases threatening to kill Moro if the government
did not satisfy their demands.7 3 Many of these letters were authored by
Moro himself, pleading with the government to negotiate.74 Moro's
family, his close colleagues in the Christian Democrat party, and even
Pope Paul VI barraged Parliament with humanitarian pleas for Moro's
life.75 Italian public opinion was split: some thought the government
should negotiate and some thought that the government should not. 76 A
few government officials advocated unofficial negotiation with the Red
Brigades, while others tried to convince Parliament that it should
negotiate openly; however, in the end, Italy did not negotiate for Moro's
life.77 When Parliament refused to negotiate, the Red Brigades murdered
Moro on May 9, 1978, fifty-five days after his capture, and left him in
the trunk of a car in the middle of Rome. 8
The Moro affair disheartened many Italians, who began to think that
the Red Brigades were invincible. 79 The Moro kidnapping, which was an
other members of the Red Brigades on trial. Id.
68. CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 32. In 1974, there were 786 terrorist incidents.
Id.
69. MEADE, supra note 11, at 97.
70. See id. at 108-09 (discussing why the Red Brigades chose Aldo Moro over the
prime minister of Italy).
71. MEADE, supra note 11, at 110.

72. Id. at 102-03.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Seton-Watson, supra note 32, at 97.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MEADE, supra note 11, at 167.
Alison Jamieson, The Italian Experience, in COMBATING THE TERRORISTS 121,
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internationally publicized event, appeared to be the greatest victory for
the Red Brigades because it was painted as a terrorist group capable of
challenging the Italian democratic state.80 In actuality, the event marked
the beginning of the decline of the Red Brigades because it motivated a
quick response from the Italian government.8'
The first legislation enacted by Parliament in reaction to the Moro
kidnapping was passed only five days after the event. 82 Law 191 of May
18, 1978 ("Law 191"),83 made kidnapping done for terrorist purposes or
against the democratic order punishable by thirty years in prison or, if the
kidnapper caused the hostage to die, a life sentence.84 The law also
reduced penalties for those who agreed to testify against former
accomplices, ceased to act in a terrorist group, or assisted with the
release of a kidnap victim. 85 The latter provision proved to be one of the
key provisions of Law 191 because it allowed the government to foster
dissention within the ranks of the Red Brigades by offering incentives to
terrorists if they repented or disassociated from the group.86
Law 191 also mandated that any rental or sales agreements for
property over one month in duration be reported to the local authorities
to assist them in the detection of terrorist safe houses.8 7 Within fortyeight hours of a sale or rental of property, the landlord had to report to
the local authorities the exact location of the property and the
identification information of the buyer or renter. 88 If the landlord did not
abide by this regulation, he was subject to a substantial fine.89
In addition to the enactment of Law 191 in 1978, Parliament
reappointed General Dalla Chiesa and a specialized, 150-member antiterror group to carry out the laws. 90 Dalla Chiesa again reported directly
to the minister of the interior and enjoyed very broad powers. 9'
Parliament, however, limited his appointment to one year (although it
131 (H. H. Tuckered., 1988).
80. Seton-Watson, supra note 32, at 98.
81. MEADE, supra note 11, at 168.
82. CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 37.
83. Law No. 191 of May 18, 1978, Gazz. Uff. No. 137, May 19, 1978; see also
CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 37 (discussing the tenets of Law 191).
84. Gazz. Uff. No. 137.
85. Gazz. Uff. No. 137.
86. This provision was later codified as Law No. 304(1) of May 29, 1982, Gazz. Uff.
No. 149, June 2, 1982. Both Law 191 and the Cossiga Law (discussed below) inspired
Parliament to enact this law specifically codifying incentives that could be given to
repentant terrorists if they aided authorities in the apprehension of other terrorist group
members.
87. Gazz. Uff. No. 137.
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. MEADE, supra note 11, at 181.
9i. Id.
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was later extended).9 2 Although Dalla Chiesa's presence did not
instantly extinguish the Red Brigades, his efforts in the counter-terrorism
operation had immediate effects. Perhaps aware of the shortcomings of
earlier efforts, Dalla Chiesa versed himself in terrorist literature and
ideology, educated himself on the individual Brigatisti, and read all
available terrorism treatises. 93 "Within three months [Dalla Chiesa] had
achieved more than all the police intelligence men had managed before
his appointment," capturing fourteen members of the Red Brigades.94
Despite the reappointment of General Dalla Chiesa and the increase
of anti-terror legislation, the elimination of the Red Brigades and
terrorism did not come for several years. Between 1978 and 1981, Italy
experienced the greatest concentration of terrorist attacks in its history.
The 1806 terrorist attacks in 1977 escalated to 2725 in 1978 and to 2139
in 1979.95 On average, Italy suffered
seven terrorist attacks a day, most
96
carried out by the Red Brigades.
Responding to the increase of terrorist activity, on February 6, 1980,
Parliament supplemented Law 191 with the Cossiga Law. 97 The law
stipulated two new aggravating factors to Law 191: "association with the
aim of terrorism and of subversion of the democratic order" and "attack
for subversive or terrorist purposes., 98 Under the first factor, "people
organizing or directing an association which proposed such [terrorist]
violence, could get sentences of seven to fifteen years without any
violence being committed." 99 Further, "[mere participation] in such an
association could get a sentence of four to eight years."' 0 0 Therefore, if
individuals were a part of an organization against the democratic order,
they could receive a prison sentence even if they had never participated

92. Id.
93. CHRISTOPHER DOBSON & RONALD PAYNE, COUNTERATTACK:
BATTLE AGAINST THE TERRORISTS 143 (1982).

THE WEST'S

94. Id.
95. MEADE, supra note 11, at 183. During the period between 1978-79, the Red
Brigades assassinated an ex-terrorism officer, a magistrate, two prison guards, two
Carabinieri as they drank coffee, three police officers in Rome, and Guido Rossa, a
factory worker, for having reported on a member of the Red Brigades who was working
in the factory. Id. at 187.
96. Id. at 183.
97. Decree Law No. 15 of Feb. 6, 1980, Gazz. Uff. No. 37, Feb. 7, 1980 (amending
Decree Law No. 625 of Dec. 15, 1979, Gazz. Uff. No. 97, Feb. 7, 1980). Law 15 is also
referred to as the Cossiga Law, after Francesco Cossiga, the minister of the interior until
the murder of Aldo Moro, at which point he became prime minister. CLUTERBUCK,
supra note 2, at 38.
98. Gazz. Uff. No. 37; see also CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 38 (discussing the
provisions under this law).

99.
100.

Gazz. Uff. No. 37;

CLUTTERBUCK,

supra note 2, at 38.

Gazz. Uff. No. 37; CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 38.
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in a violent act. 10 1
The Cossiga Law also allowed police to search residential houses or
blocks of apartments without a judicial warrant if a situation was urgent
and necessary and there was a reasonable belief that there was evidence
to be seized or if someone wanted for a terrorist crime was inside.'0 2 In
addition, the Cossiga Law mandated that police officers stop and search
suspicious persons if their behavior was unexplainable in relation to the
time and place.10 3 Police could also detain and question a suspect for
forty-eight hours without informing the judiciary, as long as the public
prosecutor verified the arrest after an independent investigation of the
suspect. 0 4 These provisions relaxed the requirements of search and
seizure as established in the Reale Law, 0 5 under which law enforcement
had to have sufficient proof that a suspect had already violated a
crime. 10 6 The Cossiga Law, on the other hand, allowed law enforcement
to stop and search if actions were suspicious.
Finally, the Cossiga Law reemphasized the provisions in Law 191
that provided for a reduction in sentences for those who supplied law
enforcement with solid information that helped identify or capture other
the reduction of a life sentence
terrorists.10 7 Such information warranted
18
to a sentence of twelve to twenty years. 0
Although Parliament hoped that the new measures would have an
immediate effect against terrorist activity, the violence did not subside
immediately. 0 9 The number of deaths related to terrorist attacks
increased in 1980, during which 134 citizens were killed and 334 citizens
were wounded." 0 A large portion of those fatalities and injuries are
attributable to a single bomb blast in a Bologna train station, which killed
eighty-five persons and wounded 177.111
Despite the increasing death toll, the anti-terror legislation
combined with the efforts of General Dalla Chiesa's anti-terror group
began to show results in 1980. In this period, Dalla Chiesa successfully
infiltrated the Red Brigades with informers, and, using the "carrot and
stick" provisions in Law 191 and the Cossiga Law, he developed the
101.

Gazz. Uff. No. 37.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.

105.
106.
107.

See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
See supra text accompanying note 52.
Gazz. Uff. No. 37.

108.

Id.

109. See MEADE, supra note 11, at 188 (stating that, although the number of attacks
decreased by sixty percent in 1980, the number of attacks against individuals increased).
110. Id.at 195.
111. Jamieson, supra note 79, at 121. This attack is attributable to right-wing terrorist
groups. Id.
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pentiti ("penitence") system." 2 When, in 1980, Dalla Chiesa captured
Patrizio Peci, leader of the Red Brigade column in Turin," 3 he was able
to deal with Peci and offer him a softer punishment in exchange for
information that led to the arrest of Mario Moretti and other members of
the leadership of the Red Brigades.14
The pentiti system proved to be a valuable counter-terrorism tool,
and, after its implementation by General Dalla Chiesa, terrorist violence
slowed dramatically." 5 While there were 833 terrorist attacks in 1980,
the number decreased
to 368 in 1981, and, by 1982, there were only 174
6
terrorist incidents. 1

The effectiveness of this twin structure of police efficiency and the
pentiti system was demonstrated after the Red Brigades kidnapped
General James Lee Dozier, commander of the NATO land forces in
Southern Europe, on December 17, 1981."17 Over 5000 anti-terror troops
searched nation-wide for the culprits of the kidnapping. 1 8 The search
resulted in the arrest of twenty wanted terrorists, and the information
gained from them led to a successful raid to rescue General Dozier on
January 28, 1982.119 The rescue
of General Dozier marked the practical
20
demise of the Red Brigades.
Convinced of the effectiveness of the pentiti system after the rescue
of General Dozier, Parliament, in 1982, enacted the Penitence Law,' 2'
which included a sunset provision for expiration on January 31, 1983.22
Before the Penitence Law, which codified the pentiti system, all offers of
leniency had been justified under Law 191 and the Cossiga Law. 123 The
112. Seton-Watson, supra note 32, at 105. Under the pentiti system, terrorists who
surrendered or "repented" could get less severe sentences if they provided law
enforcement with information leading to the arrests of other terrorists. Although the
system began by giving law enforcement the ability to offer reduced sentences to
captured members, the Italian Parliament later adopted legislation guaranteeing the right
to reduced sentences if a "repentant" terrorists surrendered and provided useful
information. See generally CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 37, 39-40, 42-45.
113. CLUTrERBUCK, supra note 2, at 31.
114. id. at 41. Although the pentiti system proved extremely useful to Dalla Chiesa's
anti-terror effort, it came at a cost to potential pentiti. Id. It provoked leaders of the Red
Brigades to threaten the lives of captured members and their families if captured
Brigatisti made any deals with the state. Id. Because of Patrizio Peci's cooperation with
Dalla Chiesa, the Red Brigades murdered his brother. Id.
115. MEADE, supranote 1l, at 1o-11.
116. Id. at 223.
117. Id. at 135-36.
118. DOBSON & PAYNE, supra note 93, at 145.
119. Id.
120. Jamieson, supra note 79, at 136.
121. Law No. 304(1) of May 29, 1982, Gazz. Uff. No. 149, June 2, 1982; see also
CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 42-43 (discussing the tenets of this law).
122. Gazz. Uff. No. 149.
123. CLUTrERBUCK, supra note 2, at 42.
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purpose of codifying the pentiti system was to identify attractive terms
for the terrorists, and to give them limited time to react. 24 To qualify
under the law, a reformed terrorist had to give information helpful in the
defeat of terrorist activity. 125 If sufficient information was offered, a
potential life-sentence could be reduced to twelve years, and non-life
sentences could be reduced by half, plus an additional one-third if the
26
information was exceptional. 1
The effects of the Penitence Law were exemplified by the arrest of
"Petrizio Peci[,] who, in spite of admitting to eight murders, was very
quickly set free."' 27 It is interesting to note that the pentiti did not have
to offer remorse for their actions, and in fact, Peci only claimed to be a
"defeated terrorist, not a repentant terrorist." 128 Between the rescue of
General Dozier in January 19821 and
mid-1983, information from pentiti
29
led to the arrest of 709 terrorists.
From 1981-86, incidents of terrorist violence dropped by an average
of eighty percent per year.' 30 The sharp decline in terrorist activity
signaled the end of the "emergency," although intermittent terrorist acts
still took place.' 31 To ensure further that all wanted terrorists had been
captured, in 1987, the Italian Parliament enacted the Disassociation
Law,132 which offered reduced sentences for crimes committed before a
particular date by those who did not want to offer information of other
terrorist group members to the authorities, but who were willing to
disassociate themselves from continued terrorist activity' 33 As an
incentive to disassociate, the government reduced life sentences to thirty
years, and, in some situations, those who disassociated from terrorism
were sentenced only to probation. 34 Among those who disassociated
was Alberto Franceschini, one of the original founders of the Red
35
Brigades. 1
Although Italy suffered great losses at the hands of the Red
Brigades, the Italian government overcame the terrorist threat by passing
tough legislation and providing law enforcement with the resources to
124.

Id.

125.

Gazz. Uff. No. 149.

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.

130.
131.

Jamieson, supranote 79, at 136.
Id.

CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 43.

Id.
Id.

132. Law No. 34(1) of Feb. 18, 1987, Gazz. Uff. No. 43, Feb. 21, 1987.
133. Gazz. Uff. No. 43; see also CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 2, at 44 (giving a general
description of this law and stating that it was only effective for one month and was only
applicable to crimes committed before December 31, 1983).
134. Id.

135.

Jamieson, supra note 79, at 136.
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implement the new laws.
III. A Survey of Recent Domestic Terrorist Activity in the United States
Like Italy in the 1970s and early 1980s, the United States is in the midst
of a terrorist "emergency."' 136 The scope of terrorism in the United States
has changed in the last thirty years. 137 Although the United States has
experienced fewer acts of terrorism than in the 1970s and 1980s, terrorist
acts today have become more destructive. 38 In the last ten years, the
United States has experienced several large-scale terrorist attacks that
have awakened the American public to the magnitude of terrorist
activity.
The most recent of these terrorist attacks happened on
September 11, 2001 .139 The scale0 of the attacks prompted Congress to
14
take the terrorist threat seriously.
Although awareness of the terrorist threat in America may not have
been a national concern until after the September 11, 2001, attacks,
terrorists have been very active on American soil for many years.
Moreover, a vast majority of terrorist attacks in the United States have
been committed by domestic terrorists related primarily to militia
organizations and special interest groups.141 This section provides a brief
survey of domestic terrorism 142 in the United States within the last ten
136. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Bush Takes on Terror, FORTUNE, Oct. 1, 2001, at 82
(referring to the current terrorism situation after September 11, 2001, as an
"emergency").
137.

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TERRORISM IN THE

UNITED STATES: 1999, at 27 (1999), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications
/terror/terror.pdf.
138. Id.
139. On September 11, 2001, terrorists crashed commercial airliners into the World
Trade Center towers in New York City and into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. On
that same day, passengers on board another commercial flight are believed to have foiled
a terrorist plot to crash an airplane into another target. The plane crashed in western
Pennsylvania, killing everyone aboard. See September 11: Chronology of Terror (Sept.
12, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/1 l/chronology.attack/ (Sept. 12, 2001).
140. Reacting to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress adopted the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.), to equip
law enforcement officials with tools to counter the terrorist threat.
141. See generally FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 137 (giving a thirtyyear history of terrorism in the United States).
142. Domestic terrorism is defined as:
[an] activity that involves acts dangerous to human life that are in violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; appear to be intended to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a

government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of government
by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occurs within the
territorial United States.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
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years.
The most publicized domestic terrorist act before September 11,
2001, was the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. 143 The
bombing took place on April 19, 1995, after McVeigh had parked a
rented Ryder truck packed with explosives outside the building.144 The
resulting blast killed 168 people, including nineteen children in a daycare
facility. 145 McVeigh received a death sentence for the act and was
executed on June 11, 2001 .146
One fact about Timothy McVeigh to which officials gave some
147
significance was that he had ties to antigovernment militia groups.
The estimated number of militia members in the United States ranges
from ten thousand to one hundred thousand. 148 Militia members are
concentrated in Montana, Idaho, Texas, Michigan, Indiana, and
149
Florida.
Before the end of the Cold War, militia groups were fixated on
theories of Soviet invasion.' 5° Today, militia members espouse a
plethora of conspiracy theories and ideologies, such as gun-control
conspiracies, white supremacy and anti-Semitic ideologies, and theories
of world domination by the United Nations.1 51 These beliefs fuel the
anti-government rhetoric of militia members. 52 Some militia members
even refuse to pay taxes and do not identify themselves as United States
citizens. 153 Militia members generally believe that there will be a war
sparked by government entities against them, and, in preparation, they
154
collect arms and conduct paramilitary and survivalist training.
Although it is legal to be in a militia group in the United States,155 the

Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001 § 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331(5) (2001)).
143. U.S.
vs.
McVeigh,
CURRENT
EVENTS,
Apr.
28,
1997,
http://proquest.umi.com/pqweb?Did=000000011653075&Fmt-3&Deli=1 &Mtd 1&Idx=
1&Sid=5&RQT=309 (last visited Jan. 25, 2002).

144.

Id.

145.
146.
147.

Id.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 137, at 30.
U.S. vs. McVeigh, supra note 143.

148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 16.

151.

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TERRORISM IN THE

BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, FIGHTING TERRORISM 15 (1995).

UNITED STATES:

1996, at 17 (1996),

available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications

/terror/terroris.pdf.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (suggesting that individuals
have the right to form militias); see also Thompson Smith, Note, The PatriotMovement:
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government is becoming increasingly concerned with the escalating
violence perpetrated by these groups. 156 Moreover, militia groups have
shown that they are capable 1of
carrying out large-scale domestic terrorist
57
actions and willing to do so.

These groups pose a clear and present danger, as demonstrated by
their growing numbers and increased violence. 5 8 Evidence of the
government's concern is the initiation of more than 900 investigations of
domestic terrorism 159 after the Oklahoma City bombing.' 60

Before

Oklahoma City, there were only 100 ongoing investigations.' 16
One group in which the government is particularly interested is
Phineas Priesthood, a violent white supremacist group with ties to the
militia movement of the extreme right.' 61 On April 1, 1996, in Spokane,
1 63
Washington, Phineas Priesthood bombed a local newspaper building.
The group used the bombing as a diversion to raid a federal bank in a
"take over" style robbery. 164 As the perpetrators were leaving the bank,
one of them lit a pipe bomb and shouted that they were retaliating for the
government's treatment of the Freedman's Organization,65another militia
group made famous for the events at Ruby Ridge, Idaho. 1
Three months later, Phineas Priesthood deposited a pipe bomb at a
Planned Parenthood building in Spokane, Washington. 66 Although no
67
one was hurt, the bomb blast caused extensive damage to the building. 1
Following their previous pattern, three masked Phineas Priesthood
members then robbed the same federal bank that they had robbed on
April 1, 1996.168 The men carried automatic weapons and one carried a
twenty-five pound propane tank bomb. 169 Law enforcement authorities
Refreshing the Tree of Liberty with Fertilizer Bombs and the Blood of Martyrs, 32 VAL.

U. L. REV. 269, 337 (1997) (stating that the Supreme Court refused to find that
individuals could not form militias, though it would have been simple for it to do so).
156. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supranote 151, at 17.
157.

Smith, supra note 155, at 277.

158.

NETANYAHU,

supra note 148, at 18.

159. One ongoing investigation concerns the derailing of a passenger Amtrak train in
Arizona on October 9, 1995. Smith, supra note 155. The antigovernment militia group
"Sons of the Gestapo" has claimed responsibility for the act. FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, supranote 137, at 30.
160. David E. Kaplan, Terrorism Threats at Home: Two Years After Oklahoma City,
Violent Sects Still Abound, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 29, 1997-Jan. 5, 1998, at 22,
24.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 27.
163. Id.
164. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 151, at 5.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 7.
167. Id.
168. Id
169. Id.
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caught the three men responsible for the terrorist attacks and bank
robberies on October 7, 1996.170 At the time they were apprehended, the
three Phineas Priesthood members were planning another terrorist
attack. 11
The 1996 Summer Olympic Games was the site of another terrorist
attack attributable to a militia member. A pipe bomb exploded in the
middle of Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia, killing two
persons and injuring 111.172 Law enforcement officials attributed the
attack to Eric Robert Rudolph, who has ties to the antigovernment militia
group "Army of God."'173 The FBI also charged Rudolph for three other
bombings in 1998.174
In addition to right-wing militia groups, the United States is also
exposed to terrorist attacks stemming from violent, domestic special
interest groups.175 Special interest groups such as Earth Liberation Front
("ELF"), an environmental extremist group, and its sister organization,
Animal Liberation Front ("ALF"), use terrorist violence to further their
political goals.176 According to the FBI, such groups have been
increasing their use of terrorism and other criminal activities. 177 In
February 2001, the FBI placed ELF at the top of its domestic terrorism
threat list,178 labeling it one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations
79
in the United States.
ELF and ALF primarily use arson and explosives as a means of
carrying out their terrorist activities.! 8 They are organized in a cell
structure, with small cells acting independently and without a central
leader.18' The groups spread their propaganda through media outlets and
their own internet websites. 182 The ELF and ALF websites even have

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Elizabeth Gleick, Terror's Venue, TIME, Aug. 5, 1996, at 22, 23.
173. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 137, at 25.
174. Id.
175. See Kaplan, supra note 160 (commenting on violent extremist groups of the far
right and left); see also Dan Gabriel, Extremist Groups Target Businesses & People,
INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, May 28, 2001, at 31 (commenting on the increase of terrorist

activity by extreme environmental groups).
176. Robert Schlesinger, Eco-Vandals Condemned as Domestic Terrorists but
Activists Say All Groups Being Tarredwith Extremist Brush, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 8, 2002.
177. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supranote 137, at 27.
178. Prop. Rights Found. of Am., Inc., Earth Liberation Front Is Now FBI's No. 1
Domestic Terrorist Threat-MainstreamMedia Finally Pick Up on the Concern of EcoTerrorism (Mar. 2001), at http://prfamerica.orgfEarthLiberationFrontNo I onFBIList.html.
179. Gabriel, supra note 175, at 31.
180. Ctr. for Food & Agric. Research, The Names: Earth LiberationFront (ELF), at
http://www.cffar.org/vandalwatch/ names/elf.html (last visited January 10, 2002).
181. Schlesinger, supra note 176.
182. Id.
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"recommended reading" sections on how to make a time bomb and start
fires by using electrical timers. 183 The characteristics of ELF and ALF
are reminiscent of the Red Brigades: they have adopted the same
organizational system as the Red Brigades; they spread their propaganda
through media outlets like the Red Brigades; and, like the Red Brigades,
their goals are political.
In 1998, ELF set fire to a Vail, Colorado, ski resort, an act that
resulted in $12 million dollars in property damage. 84 The attack was to
protest the resort's expansion plan, which, according to ELF, would have
endangered a lynx habitat. 85 In 1999, ELF set fire to a research center at
86
Michigan State University that resulted in over $400,000 in damage.'
In December 2001, ELF claimed responsibility for setting fire to four
luxury townhouses on Long Island, New York, because, according to
ELF, the construction endangered an aquifer for drinking water.' 87 The
group has also been known to pound steel spikes into trees marked for
cutting, forcing the lumber industry to expend thousands of dollars for
added safety precautions.188
ELF and ALF have not slowed their terrorist campaigns despite the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 89 They have set fire to a
McDonald's restaurant in Arizona and to a research facility in New
Mexico; they twice released minks from a fur farm in Iowa; and they
firebombed a Bureau of Land Management horse corral in Nevada,
causing $85,000 in damage. 90 Further, on January 29, 2002, ELF took
credit for setting incendiary devices at the Microbial
and Plant Genomics
19
Research Center of the University of Minnesota. 1
David Barbarash, 192 a spokesman for both groups, stated that
Americans' fear of further terrorist attacks after September 11 is no
reason to put ELF and ALF campaigns on hold. 193 Leslie James
183. Id.; see, e.g., EARTH LIBERATION FRONT, SETTING FIRES WITH ELECTRICAL
TIMERs-AN EARTH LIBERATION FRONT GUIDE, at http:// www.earthliberationfront.com/

library/elf.manual300.pdf (last visited July 30, 2002).
184. Schlesinger, supra note 176; Earth Liberation Front, Diary of Actions &
Chronology, at http://www. earthliberationfront.com/doa/ (last visited July 30, 2002).
185. Id.
186. Ctr. for Food & Agric. Research, supra note 180; Earth Liberation Front, supra
note 184.
187. Earth Liberation Front, supra note 184.
188. Id.
189. Christy Karras, Terror from Within: Environmentalists Reel Off 4 Acts of
Violence Since Horrorof Sept. 11, PATRIOT-NEWS, Nov. 17, 2001, at B 18.
190. Id.
191. Earth Liberation Front, supra note 184.
192. Barbarash receives communiques when either the ELF or ALF wants to
announce they have committed a terrorist act, and then he relays that information to the
media. Karras, supra note 189.
193. Karras, supra note 189.
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Pickering, the primary spokesman for ELF, has stated,
Those who struggle for revolutionary change in North America will
not be intimidated by the system's alleged "War on Terrorism", it's
so-called "Patriot Act" or their "House Subcommittee hearing on
Eco-Terrorism". [sic] If anything, these only exemplify the dire
struggling on the side of the
need for a revolutionary movement
94
people here in North America.1
Nevertheless, the organizations maintain that they are not terrorist groups
because they do not direct their actions against human targets. 195 It is
important to note that the Red Brigades espoused a similar ideology, and,
like ELF and ALF, did not begin their "revolution" by targeting
people. 196

Over the last few years ELF and ALF have caused over $43 million
in property damage in more than 600 attacks.' 97 Although ELF and ALF
attacks in the United States have not caused direct physical injury to
people, incidents in Western Europe and Canada attributable to these
groups have become increasingly violent. 198 Evidence of increased
violence outside the United States, and the continuing determination of
these groups to use terrorist violence as a means of influencing the
government99indicate that their violent activity in the United States will
accelerate. 1
IV. Application of the Italian Model of Counter-Terrorism to the United
States and the Domestic Terrorism Provisions in the USA Patriot
Act of 2001
The magnitude of domestic terrorist activity in the United States
warrants legislative action. Because Italy successfully eradicated the
terrorist activity of the Red Brigades, and because domestic terrorist
groups in the United States are similar in many aspects to the Red
Brigades, the Italian counter-terrorism model can be beneficial to the
eradication of United States domestic terrorism.
As the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro forced Italy to realize
that it was in the midst of a terrorist emergency, the terrorist attacks
194. Press Release, Earth Liberation Front, Former Spokesperson For Earth
Liberation Front Press Office Returns (Feb. 2, 2002), http://www.earthliberationfront.
com/ news/2002/020202m 1.html.
195. Id.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 17-26.
197. Schlesinger, supra note 176; Robert Gehrke, FBI Names Most-Active Terrorists;
Environmental Group at Top of List with 600 Attacks Since 1996, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,

Feb. 13, 2002, at 17A.
198.

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 137, at 27.

199.

Id.
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against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001, awakened America to the reality of international terrorist threats.
However, the United States must awake not only to the reality of the
international terrorist threat, but also to the looming domestic terrorist
threat. The increase in domestic terrorist activity by militia groups and
special interest organizations is similar to the activity of the Red
Brigades before the murder of Aldo Moro. 200 Therefore, understanding
Italian public policy pertaining to the eradication of domestic terrorism in
Italy can be useful by analogy to the current domestic terrorist situation
in the United States.
When considering the utility of the Italian counter-terrorism
provisions, however, it is important to note the differences between the
governments of the United States and Italy. These differences may
restrict United States lawmakers from simply translating the Italian
provisions and codifying them into United States law.
One difference between these two nations is that, unlike Italy, which
is a civil law country, the United States is a common law country. In
civil law jurisdictions, statutes are written broadly based on a set of
general legal principles, and the formation of the law in specific
circumstances is left to the judiciary.2 °1 In common law jurisdictions,
legislators attempt to draft precise statutes that will apply to particular
situations. 2 Under this approach, the job of the judiciary is not to mold
the law, but to interpret the legislation and extend it to the particular facts
of a case.20 3 Therefore, when considering the application of the Italian
counter-terrorism model to United States public policy, lawmakers must
draft provisions in detail with direction for their application.
A second difference is that the United States is organized as a
federal union while Italy is a unified republic. In Italy, Parliament is
autonomous over the various regional governments, as it must ultimately
approve the content of regional constitutions. 0 4 Unlike Italy, the United
200. In the early years of the Red Brigades, the groups staged protests and
participated in public disobedience. See supra text accompanying note 21. When Italy
did not respond, they resorted to violence, beginning with bombings and bank robberies,
and eventually kidnappings and intentional murder. See supra text accompanying notes
25-27, 65-70. Like the Red Brigades, ELF and ALF have begun their terrorist activity
without loss of life. Although the groups have not killed any person to date, such
occurrences are likely through the continued use of bombs and arson activity. See supra
text accompanying notes 198-99.
201. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law:
Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
63, 99 (2001) (discussing the differences of statutory interpretation between civil and
common law jurisdictions).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Mario Comba & Franco Pizzetti, Federalism in Italy and the Relevance of
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States Constitution restricts the federal government from encroaching on
states' autonomy. 20 5 Therefore, when considering how the United States
can emulate Italian counter-terrorism policy, United States lawmakers
must recognize that Italian lawmakers did not consider the separation of
powers between Italy's twenty regions and the national government.
A third difference concerns citizens' fundamental rights. In Italy,
citizens' fundamental rights are granted by the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and by the Italian
Constitution.20 6 Unlike Italy, where there are various sources for the
establishment of fundamental rights, in the United States, the Supreme
Court ultimately determines whether citizens enjoy fundamental rights
based on its interpretation of the United States Constitution. 20 7 Because
Italy and the United States derive fundamental rights from different
sources, it is crucial that American lawmakers consider how the
differences may affect interpretation of Italian legislation.
With these differences between Italy and the United States in mind,
and with the realization that the United States cannot transcribe Italian
law verbatim, those provisions in the Italian model of counter-terrorism
that could prove valuable to the United States may be focused upon. To
some extent, the United States has already considered the domestic
terrorist threat. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001, better known as the USA Patriot Act of 2001, which was enacted
in response to the international terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
includes provisions applicable to domestic terrorism. 20 8 The USA Patriot
Act of 2001 addresses issues of domestic security (Title I), enhanced
surveillance procedures (Title II), money laundering (Title III), border
the American Experience, 12 TuL. EUR. & CIv. L.F. 65, 73-74 (1997) (discussing the

structure of the Italian government).
205. Id. at 90; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (stating that
Congress did not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact a law pertaining
to violence against women because the subject of the law did not involve interstate
commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (stating that Congress did not
have the authority to enact gun control laws for school zones under the Commerce Clause
because the activity was not sufficiently related to interstate commerce).
206. See Antonio Brancaccio, The Protectionof Human Rights in the Decisions of the
Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 101, 102-03 (1996)

(discussing the sources for the protection of human rights in Italy).
207. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE
CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 397-98 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing how the Supreme
Court derives fundamental rights from the United States Constitution).
208. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 213, 115 Stat. 272, 285 (2001) (covering surveillance); id. §§ 801-17
(covering criminal laws relating to terrorism).
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protection (Title IV), terrorism investigations (Title V), victim relief
(Title VI), information sharing (Title VII), criminal laws concerning
terrorism (Title VIII), and improved intelligence (Title IX).2 °9 The
provisions relating to criminal laws concerning terrorism and
surveillance are most applicable to domestic terrorist activity.
Congress defines "domestic terrorism" in the USA Patriot Act of
2001 as:
[an] activity that involves acts dangerous to human life that are in
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
to affect the conduct of government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and occurs within the territorial United
States.21 °

When this definition is read with Congress's definition of the federal
crime of terrorism, 211 which lists all criminal offenses that can be
associated with terrorism, it is clear that an act must intend or appear to
intend to influence the government or a civilian population before it can
be considered a terrorist activity.2 12 Under this definition, the respective
bombings, arsons, bank robberies, and other acts of Phineas Priesthood,
ELF, and ALF are appropriately considered domestic terrorist activities.
Responding directly to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
involving commercial airliners, Congress established, as a federal
offense, an attack against a mass transportation system.2 13 The offense is
214
punishable by fine or by imprisonment of not more than twenty years.
209. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001.
210. Id. § 802 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2001)).
211. Id. § 808 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)).
212. HOUSE JUDICIARY DEMOCRATIC STAFF, H.R. 3162-USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001:
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS (2001), http://www.house.gov/judiciarydemocrats
/usapatriotsecbysec 102301 .pdf.
213. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001 § 801 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1993 (2001)). This section defines "[t]errorist attacks and other acts of violence
against mass transportation systems." Id. The offense includes train wrecking, derailing,
setting fire to, or disabling a mass transportation vehicle ("MTV") or ferry; placing of a
biological agent or toxin on or near a MTV or ferry with intent to endanger persons;
sabotage; setting fire to or placing a biological agent, weapon, or destructive device on
the property of the mass transportation provider with knowledge that it is likely to derail,
disable, or wreak a MTV or ferry; interfering with operation of MTV or ferry with intent
to endanger safety of persons; committing an act with intent to cause death or serious
bodily injury while on the property of a mass transportation provider; conveying false
information with intention of committing an act prohibited in this section; or attempting,
threatening, or conspiring to do any of these acts. Id.
214. Id. § 801(a)(8), (b).
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However, if the offense occurs when the mass transportation vehicle is
carrying a passenger, or if death results from the act, then the crime may
be punishable by life imprisonment.21 5 Additionally, the USA Patriot
Act of 2001 allows law enforcement to seize assets of international and
domestic terrorists or organizations planning or engaging in terrorist
acts, 2 16 and it increases penalties for terrorist crimes 217 and terrorist
conspiracies.2" 8 The law also makes it illegal to possess a biological
weapon without reasonable justification.219
These provisions of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 illustrate
Congress's reactionary response to the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001. Italy reacted in similar fashion after the kidnapping of Aldo Moro
when it enacted legislation to increase the punishment for kidnapping if
done for terrorist purposes or against the democratic order. 220 The same
law mandated that landlords report rental and sales agreements of real
property to the government in the hope of discovering terrorist safe
221
houses.
Despite the similarities of these reactions, the reaction of Italy to the
kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro differs in one important respect to
the United States reaction after the September 11, 2001, attacks.
Although both nations reacted to large-scale terrorist attacks by enacting
harsher punishments for terrorist crimes, only Italy instituted a
formalized system of mercy as a means of eradicating domestic
terrorism. 222 This provision of the Italian law, which came to be known
as the pentiti system, provided a "carrot" as an alternative to the "stick"
of harsh penalties. As discussed in previous sections, this provision, as
implemented by General Dalla Chiesa, proved to be one of the most
effective counter-terrorism tools because it turned members of the Red
Brigades against each other. 223 In the words of former Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the pentiti system "broke the back" 224 of

215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id. § 806 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)).
Id. § 810 (amending various sections in the U.S.C.).

218.

Id.

219. Id.§ 817.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 82-89. It should be noted that Italy did not
define "domestic terrorism" per se, but viewed terrorist acts as those acts done for
terrorist purposes or against the democratic order. By definition, such a classification of
terrorism is significantly broader than the definition in the USA Patriot Act of 2001.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89. Although this provision will not be
explored further in this comment, such a policy could benefit United States law
enforcement in its efforts to track suspected terrorists, particularly in crowded cities.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86, 107-08, 121-35.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
224. Netanyahu, supra note 1. Benjamin Netanyahu, former Israeli prime minister,
uses this term to illustrate what Western nations must do to effectively eradicate
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the Red Brigades.
Unlike Italy, the United States has implemented only the "stick"
provisions as counter-terrorism methods.225 In the current fight against
domestic terrorism, Congress can benefit from the experiences of other
democracies in comparable situations. Hindsight shows that a "carrot"
system, providing mercy to terrorists in exchange for solid information
leading to the arrest of other terrorists, has the potential to break down an
entire terrorist network.
The pentiti "carrot" provision goes beyond the well-known pleabargaining system utilized by United States prosecutors. In order for a
person to take advantage of plea-bargaining in the United States, that
person must be captured. The captured person has practically no
bargaining power, and the decision to provide leniency rests solely with
the prosecutor. Under the pentiti system, a terrorist is permitted to
contemplate whether the "deal" that the state is offering is worth his
surrender. If the terrorist chooses to take the "carrot," the state is
obligated to offer leniency if the terrorist provides sufficient information
leading to the arrest of other terrorists. American lawmakers should not
overlook the effectiveness of the Italian pentiti system; rather, they
should explore options for adopting a similar strategy.22 6
To implement an effective "carrot" strategy, legislators must also
provide for a very big "stick." This not only includes establishing harsh
penalties for terrorism crimes but also extending the crime of terrorism to
reach those on the periphery. To some extent, Congress did this in the
USA Patriot Act of 2001 by making it unlawful to harbor a person whom
one knows or reasonably should know has committed or is about to
commit a terrorist act. 227 An offense under this provision can carry a fine
or imprisonment up to ten years.228 The Act also made it a crime to
knowingly provide "monetary instruments or financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe
houses, false documentation or identification, communications
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel,
terrorism.
225. The United States does not have a law codifying a "carrot" provision that can be
offered to repentant terrorists in exchange for their cooperation. However, such
incentives may be offered through other programs.
226. United States lawmakers should also consider when such a provision should be
enacted. One benefit of early implementation is that it may not be as controversial as if it
were adopted after a major terrorist attack. On the other hand, if the provisions are
enacted too early, terrorists, and would-be terrorists, may not take the "stick" provisions
(discussed below) seriously, as they may expect to be shown mercy later.
227. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 803, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2001)).
228. Id.
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transportation, and other physical assets" to terrorists. 229 A violation of
this law is punishable by fine or imprisonment for up to fifteen years,
but, if the act results in a death of a person, the offense is punishable by
up to life imprisonment.2 30
These provisions of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 establish a starting
point for considering further measures used by Italy to extend the crime
of terrorism to reach those who participate on the margins of terrorist
organizations. After the passage of the Cossiga Law, a person could be
considered a terrorist for organizing or directing an association that
espoused the use of terrorist violence, or for mere participation in a
terrorist organization, even if that person never participated in a violent
act. 231 This exceeds the provisions in the USA Patriot Act of 2001 for
harboring a terrorist or providing material support to a terrorist.
Implementing a law comparable to the Cossiga Law in the United States
would make any member of Phineas Priesthood, Earth Liberation Front,
or Animal Liberation Front a terrorist. This type of law could be drafted
to apply to those acting in capacities similar to David Barbarash and
Leslie232James Pickering, both of whom act as spokesmen for ELF and
ALF.
The imposition of the harsh sentences on those who are only
marginally associated with terrorist organizations may create an
overwhelming incentive for these persons to renounce their "cause."
Moreover, once a few fringe terrorists take advantage of the "carrot," the
information obtained will help to undermine, and perhaps eventually
destroy, the entire organization. Like Italy, the United States could limit
these incentives and safeguard against abuse by providing a sunset
provision and by narrowing application to certain crimes committed
before a certain date. 233
This limitation would work to eliminate
manipulation of the system by those seeking to commit terrorist acts
knowing that they will be forgiven later.
In addition to establishing a working definition of domestic
terrorism, the USA Patriot Act of 2001 enhances the surveillance power
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 192-94. Criminalizing membership in
terrorist organizations warrants First Amendment scrutiny. This comment does not
attempt to solve those issues, but rather, to present policy options that may aid the United
States in its battle with domestic terrorism. Whether or not membership in terrorist
organizations can be criminalized, the United States should enact laws to reach members
who act on the periphery.
233. The Penitence Law narrowed the applicability of the statute by enacting a sunset
provision. See supra note 122. The Disassociation Law enacted a sunset provision, and
limited the applicability of the law to crimes committed before a certain date. See supra
note 132.
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of law enforcement.234 The legislation allows law enforcement to delay
notice of a search warrant in an ongoing criminal investigation if there
would otherwise be an adverse result. 235 However, the law does not

permit law enforcement to seize any tangible property, wire, or electronic
communication unless it is necessary. 236 The law also states that notice
of the warrant must be given within a reasonable amount of time of the
search.237
While this measure may improve police surveillance in domestic
terrorism investigations, 238 it is not a proactive investigative tool.
Compared to the USA Patriot Act of 2001, the Cossiga Law provided
Italian law enforcement with significantly more authority to conduct
searches and to seize property if the search or seizure related to domestic
terrorism. Under the Cossiga Law, officers could search houses, persons,
or vehicles if the situation proved urgent and necessary under the
circumstances. 239 Permitting United States law enforcement to delay
notice of a warrant in domestic terrorism investigations only sanctions a
search for evidence for which there is probable cause to believe exists.
Furthermore, a judicial warrant is still required for the search. 240 This
provision in the USA Patriot Act of 2001 is useful only for verification
purposes, and, even then, only if notice of the search would have an
"adverse result" or would hinder an ongoing investigation.24'
Conversely, the Italian law gave law enforcement the discretion to
investigate situations where they suspected terrorist related activity. This
proactive measure permitted law enforcement to seek new information.
Moreover, the ability of law enforcement to acquire new information
promoted the effectiveness of General Dalla Chiesa's pentiti system as
the probability that members of the Red Brigades would be captured
234. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001 § 213 (amending 18
U.S.C. § 3103a (2001)).
235. Id. An "adverse result" occurs when "notice would endanger the life or physical
safety of an individual, result in flight from prosecution, destruction of or tampering with
evidence, intimidation of potential witnesses or otherwise seriously jeopardized an
investigation or unduly delay a trial." 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2).
236. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001 § 213.
237. Id.; see also Nat Hentoff, Burglarswith Badges, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 11, 2001,
at 31 ("The FBI interprets 'reasonable amount of time' to be ninety days, although a
judge can grant an extension for 'good cause."').
238. The discussion of the surveillance provisions of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 in
this comment is concerned only to their application to domestic terrorism investigations,
not to all ongoing criminal investigations.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 102-06.
240. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001 § 213.
241. Id.
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increased.
Considering the differences in government structure, statutory
interpretation, and fundamental rights between the United States and
Italy, the United States should seek to adopt proactive legislation that
allows law enforcement to gain new information in domestic terrorism
investigations. Although verification of known information is important
to an ongoing investigation, it is reactionary. The United States must
enact proactive counter-terrorism measures if intends to take the
domestic terrorist threat seriously.
V.

Conclusion

The question raised by many, if not all, Americans after September
11, 2001, is whether the United States can eradicate terrorism from its
own soil. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believes
that the United States can conquer terrorism, but whether it is willing to
do so depends on whether the United States has reached the "moment of
truth" that has caused other Western democracies to take strong action.242
The adoption of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 indicates that the United
States has reached the "moment of truth" with respect to international
terrorism. Whether the United States has reached such a decisive
moment as to domestic terrorism is yet to be established. Although the
USA Patriot Act of 2001 includes provisions applicable to domestic
counter-terrorism efforts, 243 they are only first steps. The United States
must adopt further legislation to counter the domestic threat.
The Italian experience with the Red Brigades in the 1970s and
1980s offers the United States valuable lessons applicable to the fight
against domestic terrorist groups in America. The first and most basic of
these lessons is that a democracy needs to take domestic terrorist threats
seriously. Complacency on the part of the Italian government at the end
of the first wave of activity of the Red Brigades in the mid-1970s
resulted in a resurgence of violence for which the Italian government
found itself unprepared.2 44
If Italy had taken the domestic threat
seriously, the levels of violence experienced by Italian people may have
been prevented.
Second, the United States must be willing to enact legislation that
gives law enforcement the tools necessary quench domestic terrorism.
Such provisions may include extending the crime of terrorism to reach
those on the periphery, as well as giving law enforcement added
surveillance authority.
242.
243.
244.

NETANYAHU, supra note 148, at 40.
See supra text accompanying notes 208-19.
See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
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Finally, and perhaps most significant, the United States should
explore its own version of a pentiti system that would provide incentives
to terrorists, or would-be terrorists, to disassociate from violent activity.
The implementation of such a system would allow law enforcement to
gather important intelligence information and to work to dissolve
terrorist organizations from the inside out.

